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HOWARD LATIN'S ANALYSIS OF THE
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSIDERATIONS IN THE
DECISIONS OF JUDGE BREYER
WESLEY A. MAGAT*
I
INTRODUCTION
In selecting Judge Stephen Breyer's decisions as a "database" to examine
the influence of economic reasoning in appellate decisionmaking, Howard
Latin chooses an excellent example,' for Judge Breyer brings an unusually
sophisticated understanding of economics to the bench. Breyer's earlier
writings on regulatory law and economics are quite noteworthy, and Latin's
interesting analysis provides new insight into his judicial philosophy.
However, both of their conclusions on the role of economics in judicial
decisionmaking are lacking.
A few years ago Judge Breyer observed that he had "seen few cases, if any,
in the decision of which economics played an important role." 2 After
reviewing Breyer's appellate decisions, Latin concludes that "although micro-
efficiency effects may be worthy of judicial contemplation and may
occasionally prove decisive . . . . systematic economic analysis can seldom
provide the ultimate basis for judgments by appellate courts." 3 Given the
proliferation of law and economics courses in law schools, the recent
appointment of several distinguished law and economics scholars to the
federal bench, 4 and the attention focused on the subject in academic journals
and conferences, 5 their conclusions are surprising. If economics has
contributed so little to appellate decisions, why has there been so much
attention placed on the role of economics in law?
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LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
This comment presents three points concerning the role of economics in
legal decisionmaking. First, neither Latin nor Breyer clearly distinguishes
between the use of economic analysis in structuring legal decisions and
reliance upon economic efficiency as the central decisionmaking criterion.
Perhaps because of Judge Richard Posner's controversial and well-known
position, 6 much attention in the field of law and economics has focused on
economic efficiency as a guide for judicial decisionmaking, while neglecting
economic analysis. However, rejection of economic efficiency as the central
decisional criterion does not preclude the use of economic analysis in
judgments based upon other criteria. 7
Second, economic analysis provides a structure for the analysis of many
cases. It offers a framework for systematically identifying important
considerations in a decision, such as the costs, benefits, and distributional
consequences of that decision. If judges use decisionmaking criteria that are
based upon behavioral consequences of decisions rather than pure concern
for the decisionmaking process, then they must be able to assess behavioral
differences resulting from alternative judgments. Economics provides such a
methodology for predicting the behavior of individuals and corporations
under competing decisional outcomes. It should be noted that appellate and
trial courts may have different needs for economic analysis. At the appellate
level, the proper question is more likely whether the trial court considered the
economic consequences of its decision, rather than whether it reached the
correct economic decision.
Finally, Latin's taxonomy of six decisional criteria (allocation of
institutional responsibilities, justiciability constraints, unquantifiable and
incommensurable interests, fairness and evenhanded justice, global efficiency
effects, and microefficiency effects)" unnecessarily isolates economic efficiency
as only one of the six criteria for reaching legal decisions. Welfare economics
has developed a precise definition of economic efficiency that is much broader
than Latin's concept of microefficiency effects. 9  By utilizing welfare
economics' definition of economic efficiency and its additional evaluative
criterion of distributional equity,' 0 one can collapse Latin's six criteria into
two. As in any problem with multiple objectives, reducing the number of
objectives decreases the number of trade-offs which must be considered and
makes systematic decisionmaking easier.
6. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986).
7. See Breyer, Economics andjudging: An Afterword on Cooter and Wald, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1987, at 248; Gibbons, Antitrust, Law & Economics, and Politics, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1987, at 217-18.
8. Latin, supra note 1, at 58, 59-71.
9. See A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975).
10. See id.
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II
REINTERPRETATION OF LATIN'S Six DECISIONAL CRITERIA
In order to understand better the proper role of economic efficiency in
judicial decisionmaking, and to appreciate better the role of economic analysis
in those decisions, it is useful to reinterpret Latin's six decisional criteria in
light of traditional definitions of economic efficiency and distributional equity
found in welfare economics.
A. Allocation of Institutional Responsibilities
There is no question that "[t]he authority of federal appellate courts is
frequently circumscribed by their need to preserve the decisionmaking
prerogatives of other institutions."" Based on his review of Judge Breyer's
appellate decisions, Latin concludes that this first criterion was more
important in determining the outcomes of Breyer's decisions than any of the
other five.' 2 This conclusion, however, need not imply that courts must
ignore economic efficiency or distributional equity when considering the
decisionmaking prerogatives of lower courts, regulatory agencies, or
legislatures. General rules for deciding cases or issuing regulations can have
a firm base in economic efficiency or equity criteria, even if specific
applications of those rules lead occasionally to inefficient decisions.
The broader, more precise definition of allocative efficiency does not
require reversal of lower court or regulatory agency decisions whenever new
knowledge is acquired which indicates that those decisions were flawed. This
is an example of the classic economics problems of one instrument (in this
case, the original decision by the lower court) controlling two variables (the
past actions and future actions governed by the decisions). Under one view,
deference to precedent eliminates the risk that would otherwise ensue if, at a
later date, another court overturned precedent and thus created financial
losses for parties relying upon it. Conversely, precedent which is later
discovered to be inefficient perpetuates wasteful behavior. In deciding
whether to disturb precedent, a court must provide incentives for efficient
behavior in the future, without either creating additional risk that precedent
will again change or imposing undue adverse distributional consequences on
individuals and organizations which relied upon precedent as a basis for their
past decisions.
This trade-off suggests that courts should overturn precedent only when it
is discovered to be particularly inefficient. When reversing precedent, courts
should carefully craft the new judicial policy such that the costs of reversal are
acceptable to disadvantaged parties. Options for minimizing the cost of
reversing lower courts and regulatory agencies include limiting the size of the
class of cases in which the law is changed, grandfathering parties covered
under the old ruling, or paying compensation to those parties suffering losses
11. Latin, supra note 1, at 59.
12. Id.
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as a consequence of the reversal.' 3 Of course, the courts have less power to
provide compensation than do legislatures.
With a particularly nice example, Latin illustrates that deference to the
orderly allocation of institutional responsibilities sometimes requires courts
to forego single-minded pursuit of economic efficiency.' 4 In several utility
regulation cases before Judge Breyer, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission sought to reduce future natural gas rates.' 5  Following
controlling Supreme Court authority, Breyer blocked the agency's proposed
action even though it would have resulted in more efficient rates. 16 However,
when the structure of governmental decisionmaking permits courts to alter
precedent, they must know the magnitude of the efficiency and distributional
effects of such a change in order to balance those effects against the inherent
stability of settled precedent.
B. Justiciability Constraints
Justiciability constraints based on doctrines such as mootness, ripeness,
and standing also may be interpreted as judicial responses to the objective of
promoting economically efficient behavior. Because appellate courts can
devote significant amounts of time to only a limited number of cases, they
must focus their efforts upon those cases with the greatest potential
precedential impact. This raises the question of how to allocate the court's
fixed resources for decisionmaking among all the cases which come before it.
Unless resources are unlimited, the answer necessarily requires that judges
give some discretion to lower courts and administrative agencies. The
necessary implication is that there will be some disputes that a reviewing court
would have decided differently if it had the time to review them de novo. Given
limited judicial resources, spending more time reviewing some cases will
cause others to be inadequately reviewed, if reviewed at all.
Breyer's decision in Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke 17 is a
good example of the interplay between justiciability constraints and economic
efficiency objectives. Latin argues forcefully that economic efficiency would
have been better served if Breyer had decided Berkshire on its merits, rather
than refusing to adjudicate it for mootness.18 Even if appellate courts could
disregard mootness doctrine in order to promote economic efficiency, it
would be quite difficult to determine which "moot" cases deserve further
analysis. Moreover, substantive questions could be much more difficult than
questions of mootness. However, if an adjudication of mootness in a given
13. See, e.g., Harrison & Portney, Who Loses from Reform of Environmental Regulation?, in REFORM OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 147 (W. Magat ed. 1982).
14. Latin, supra note 1, at 60-61.
15. See Distrigas of Mass. Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 737 F.2d 1208 (lst Cir.
1984), appeal following remand for further proceedings, 751 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1984); Distrigas of Mass.
Corp. v. Boston Gas Co., 693 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir. 1982).
16. See Distrigas of Mass. Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 751 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir.
1984).
17. 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985).
18. Latin, supra note 1, at 61-62.
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case guides actors' decisions in future similar disputes, mootness may provide
appellate courts with an efficient screen for substantive questions in selecting
cases upon which to focus significant resources.
C. Unquantifiable and Incommensurable Interests
Both Judge Breyer and Professor Latin agree that economic analysis is of
little use in deciding cases based on theories involving the right to free
speech, due process of law, or equal protection.1 9 Distinguishing between
"economic methodology" and "economic terminology" in order to set
himself apart from Posner and Gary Becker, Latin argues that the Chicago
School uses only economic terminology instead of economic methodology. 20
Posner's 1986 Richard T. Ely Lecture,2' which provides an enlightening
economic analysis (using economic methodology) of the first amendment
rights to free speech and religious freedom, demonstrates, however, that
Latin's distinction does not work. Indeed, the more interesting question here
is the extent to which cases involving rights should be decided on the basis of
economic efficiency.
D. Fairness and Evenhanded Justice
Latin introduces this fourth criterion to distinguish between fairness issues
involving the process by which the legal system reaches decisions and the equity
of the social outcomes produced by those legal decisions. 22 This is a useful
distinction, and economists ought to recognize that questions of fairness can
revolve around process issues as well as allocational effects of decisions.
Consider the example which Latin presents regarding recovery for pure
economic losses in tort cases. 23 Latin argues that economic analysis will be of
little use to courts comparing the magnitude of the plaintiff's damages, a
traditional economics issue, and the defendant's degree of culpability, an
issue of process fairness, in order to decide whether to permit recovery of
pure economic losses.2 4 Perhaps economics cannot help resolve this fairness
question, but it can identify the distributional consequences of allowing
recovery. Without knowledge of these distributional consequences, judges
would be left with highly abstract and imprecise theories with which to resolve
the matter.
E. Global Efficiency Effects
By distinguishing this criterion from the last criterion of microefficiency
effects, Latin recognizes that economic efficiency can be examined with either
19. Id. at 62-63.
20. Id.
21. Posner, The Law and Economics Movement, AM. EcON. REV. PAPERS & PROC., May 1987, at 1.
22. Latin, supra note 1, at 63.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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a short run (case-by-case) approach or a long run (multicase) approach.25
Selection of the proper economic efficiency criterion depends upon whether it
is administratively feasible and affordable for courts to resolve all issues on a
case-by-case basis. The criterion of global efficiency effects recognizes that
courts possess limited resources and that case-by-case efficiency analyses may
be very difficult to carry out.26 Concerns for simplicity, uniformity, judicial
economy, and administrability express the need for courts to adopt an
approach based on the simultaneous consideration of an entire class of
related cases, rather than resolving disputes on a case-by-case basis.
Contrary to Latin's view that economics was not important in resolving
Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc. 27 and Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell
Corp.,2 s those decisions illustrate the need for rigorous use of economic
reasoning. In Kartell, Breyer drew upon his economics background by
reasoning that, to the extent there is competition in the market for medical
services, grossly inefficient pricing practices cannot long survive. 29 Likewise,
his finding in Grinnell that "this type of attack on prices that exceed both
incremental and average costs would more likely interfere with the
procompetitive aims of the antitrust laws than further them"30 again displayed
classical economic reasoning.
F. Microefficiency Effects
Latin argues that Kenworth of Boston, Inc. v. Paccar Fin. Corp.31 is Judge
Breyer's decision most nearly determined by considerations of economic
efficiency.3 2 Nevertheless, he contends, even Kenworth ultimately was decided
on grounds other than economic efficiency. 33
Latin has misinterpreted the decision. Economic analysis is particularly
important in antitrust and regulatory cases. Kenworth was easy to decide
because it presented no tying arrangement.3 4 However, in cases with true
tying arrangements, economic analysis is important in predicting market
allocations which would result with and without the tying arrangement. For
example, if the firm with the tying arrangement lacks market power, then
market forces will discipline any inefficient allocational effects caused by the
arrangement. Thus, while decisions such as Kenworth ultimately may rest
upon criteria other than allocative efficiency, economic efficiency is
25. Id. at 65.
26. Id. at 67-68.
27. 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984).
28. 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
29. 749 F.2d at 927-28.
30. 724 F.2d at 236.
31. 735 F.2d 622 (1st Cir. 1984).
32. Latin, supra note 1, at 69.
33. Id. at 70.
34. 735 F.2d at 624. "A tying arrangement is the sale or lease of one item ('tying product') only
on condition that the buyer or lessee take a second item ('tied product') from the same source." P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 733(a) (1978). For a discussion of the legality of tying
arrangements, see id. at t 733.
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indispensable to a court's proper understanding of the effects of tying
arrangements.
III
CONCLUSION
Howard Latin provides a fascinating account of howJudge Breyer uses and
chooses not to use economic analysis in his decisions. By arguing that
economics is of little use in appellate decisionmaking, Latin challenges the
view shared by many scholars and judges that economics presently is
employed widely in legal decisionmaking and should be used even more
often.
With a view of economics broader than Latin's, one finds a much more
important role for economic analysis in appellate decisionmaking. First, while
economic efficiency need not be given central importance as a decisionmaking
criterion, economic analysis provides an invaluable methodology for
predicting the behavior of individuals and corporations under competing
decisional outcomes. Second, economic analysis provides judges with a
highly useful structure for analyzing cases. Finally, when broadly construed,
the two criteria of economic efficiency and distributional equity encompass
the six narrower decisional criteria which Latin offers, thus considerably
simplifying the analysis necessary to reach judicial decisions under his
taxonomy.
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